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The paper examines the rationale for creating a database on labour market reforms and looks 
at the value-added of LABREF compared with existing datasets. In doing so, it considers 
recent developments in the economic literature as regards the design of labour market 
institutions. After a description of the coverage and structure of the database and of the 
information contained therein, the paper provides a summary overview of reforms enacted by 
EU Member States in 2004. On the base of the qualitative information in the database, the 
paper builds simple indicators of reform intensity and makes a tentative characterisation of 
the reforms strategy implemented by the Member States in 2004. 
                                                 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs - Labour Market Unit. e-mail: 
alfonso.arpaia@cec.eu.int; declan.costello@cec.eu.int; gilles.mourre@cec.eu.int; 
fabiana.pierini@cec.eu.int. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors only. No responsibility 
for them should be attributed to the European Commission. Sections of the text may be quoted provided that full 
credit is given to the source.  
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1. Introduction 
For some time, the European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs has been working with the Labour Market Working Group (LMWG) attached to the 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) to develop a more effective framework for the 
surveillance of labour markets and for analysing the impact of reforms on labour market 
performance. The aim of this joint effort is to support work carried out in the framework of 
EU economic policy coordination processes, and to improve the understanding of labour 
markets and labour market institutions as part of general economic surveillance of Member 
States’ economies. The motivation comes form the growing interest of economic literature on 
the relationship between labour market institutions and labour market performance. It is now 
widely recognised that “the labour market will not function well without proper institutions”
2, 
that is, without an appropriate mix of established arrangements affecting the functioning
 of the 
labour market and shaped by the policy strategies instituted and enforced by governments and 
relevant collective actors 
3.  
While considerable efforts have been made to establish comparable datasets on labour market 
institutions, the information provided by available qualitative indicators on time-varying 
labour market institutions is far from exhaustive. Existing databases mainly focus on the 
aggregate characteristics of the institutional variables and often lack timeliness or 
comprehensiveness. The need for improved institutional databases has been underlined by 
many authors who argue that the lack of well developed data has not allowed a full analysis of 
the multiple and complex linkages between labour institutions and labour market 
performance
4. 
In light of these considerations, DG ECFIN has, together with the LMWG, established a 
database of those reform measures which are intended to modify relevant labour market 
institutions in the EU-25. The LABREF database
5 was launched in December 2005. It 
systematically records, on an annual basis, information on reforms that are likely to have an 
impact on labour market performance
6. The LABREF database is conceived as an instrument 
to provide information on the design of reforms, their scope and their durability. As such, it 
focuses on selected characteristics of reform measures and provides information on their 
expected implementation phase. Moreover, the database enables tracking reforms by country, 
by policy area and by one or more key characteristics of the reform design, thus allowing for 
cross-country analysis on the number and type of reforms enacted in a particular year, as well 
as for covering a longer time horizon.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 examines the rationale for creating a database on 
labour market reforms and looks at the value-added of LABREF compared with existing 
                                                 
2 Blanchard (2002, p.1). 
3 For a definition of labour market « institutions » and « policies » see Betcherman (2000). 
4 See, for instance, Dreger, C., R. Ramos and J. Surinach (2005), IMF (2003) and Gomez-Salvador R, J. Messina 
and G. Vallanti (2004). 
5 The database can be freely accessed at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/labref_en.htm 
6 Obviously, the link between labour market reforms and performance is not direct, as, for instance, legislative 
acts are the first step and are usually followed by implementation decrees. Hence, the database covers only the 
first layer of the relationship between policies and performance.  
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datasets. In doing so, it considers recent developments in the economic literature as regards 
the design of labour market institutions. Section 3 describes the coverage and structure of the 
database and the information contained therein. Section 4 provides a summary overview of 
reforms enacted by EU Member States in 2004. As such, it is illustrative of the potential use 
of the database, which will be updated annually. There are also plans to backdate the 
information in LABREF to 1995 for EU15 countries and to 2000 for EU10 countries. Section 
5 provides a preliminary characterisation of the labour market reforms enacted in the Member 
States in 2004. 
 
 
2.  The value-added of the LABREF database 
  
2.1.   The theoretical context: the crucial but complex role of labour market institutions in 
labour market performances 
 
Since the second half of the 1990s, there has been a growing interest among economic 
researchers in the relationship between labour market institutions and labour market 
performance
7.  This starts from the recognition that the assumptions behind the theoretical 
model of a competitive economy (complete markets, perfect information, atomistic and 




A more realistic description of labour markets takes into account wage and price formation in 
imperfectly competitive markets, where employment is determined by the interplay between a 
price curve and a wage bargaining curve and nominal wages are the result of negotiations 
between employers and employees. From this perspective, labour market institutions 
influence the stock of employment and unemployment by (i) modifying the wage formation 
mechanisms, (ii) by changing the price elasticity of product demand, and (iii) by stimulating 
technological progress
9. Moreover, when looking at labour market performance as the 
outcome of a matching process between unemployed and job vacancies, search and matching 
models emphasise the presence of the heterogeneity of workers and jobs, of imperfect 
information about the characteristics of potential employers and employees and of restrictions 
on labour mobility that influence job creation and job destruction
10. Both stocks and flows 
approaches show that labour market institutions - such as unemployment and welfare-related 
benefits, the extent of coordination and centralisation of wage bargaining, the nature of labour 
market regulation and of labour taxation - affect firms’ hiring and firing decisions and 
individuals’ readiness and willingness to take up a job. They also affect the extent to which 
unemployment reins in inflationary pressures. 
                                                 
7 See among others: Nickell (1997), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000); Kahn (2000), Bertola, Blau and Kahn 
(2001), Blanchard and Portugal (2001), Besley and Burgess (2004), Neumark and Wascher (2004), Bertola 
(2004) and Blanchard (2004). 
8 See Blanchard (2005).  
9 For a complete argumentation and review of literature, see the European Commission (2004), Chapter 3 and 
IMF (2003), Chapter 4. 
10 For a description of the stock and flows approaches to equilibrium employment see Blanchard (2005).  
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Although a full consensus on the role of each institution has not been achieved, empirical 
evidence broadly suggests that institutions can explain a significant share of cross-country 
differences in labour market performance. Researchers also agree on the need to look at the 
whole configuration of labour market institutions to take account of the role played by their 
multiple interactions
11 on labour market outcomes. This should be a precondition for 
evaluating (and reforming) labour market institutions
12. 
More generally, it is increasingly acknowledged that the effects of different policies and 
institutions on the labour market are neither simple nor univocal. Not only the interactions 
among institutions, but also their interactions with other variables such as economic growth, 
demographic patterns or technological developments - as well as with political changes 
motivated by non-economic reasons - matter for labour market performance
13. Such 
interactions are important to understand whether identical reforms in two different countries 
will or will not have similar effects and whether wide-ranging reforms will be more effective 
than piecemeal measures. Finally, variations among labour market outcomes also depend on 
the efficiency of the enforcement and implementation.  
 
The recognition of the multidimensionality of labour market institutions and of the existence 
of complementarities among them leads to the following considerations: 
 
•  since labour market institutions do not work in isolation, a comprehensive approach is 
needed in the macroeconomic evaluation of reforms modifying such institutions, 
which takes account of both the interaction between labour market institutions and 
country specific circumstances; 
 
•  reforms themselves need to be comprehensive in order to be effective and to generate 
better outcomes. Reforms which tackle more than one policy field are more likely to 
create an institutional setting conducive to high employment growth and low 
unemployment, because coordinated changes in related policy areas can cause 
mutually reinforcing effects on labour market dynamics, while, on the other hand, 
absence of complementary reforms in adjacent policy areas can be at the origin of 
disappointing effects (Eichhorst, W. and R. Kolne-Seidl (2005));
14 
 
•  the quality of the reform design of labour market institutions matters for the 
performance of the labour market and of the economy in general.
15 Reforms can be 
                                                 
11 See for all Belot and van Ours (2001, 2004), IMF (2003) and Boeri (2005). 
12 See Eichhorst, W. and R. Konle-Seidl (2005). 
13 See Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). 
14 However, a gradual approach can overcome the resistance to comprehensive reforms which entail some 
uncertainty on the transition costs either real or perceived by those agents involved (Dewatripont and Roland 
(1995)).     
15 A review of literature can be found in European Commission (2004), Chapter 3, and in Arpaia and Mourre 
(2005).   
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•  while useful insights can be drawn by making cross-country comparisons over a short 
time horizon, looking at time-series allows for a wider set of indicators to be used 
which go beyond the simple tracking of reforms. This enables more comprehensive 
analyses and assessments of reform strategies to be made - by looking for instance at 
the coherence and comprehensiveness of reforms in different areas, at the 
complementarities across reforms, at whether reforms in one year are offset by 
reforms later on. A longer time horizon can also be used in order to carry out analysis 
on the actual impact of reforms on labour market outcomes
17. 
 
These considerations have important bearings on:  
 
•  the process for tracking/monitoring labour market reforms: the literature underlines 
the importance to move beyond the listing of reform measures, an approach which is 
essentially static, descriptive and takes little account of the importance of interactions 
between reforms. It recommends instead focusing on certain “desirable” 
characteristics of the reform design
18;  
 
•  the assessment of the impact of labour market reform on labour market outcomes: the 
literature underlines the complexity of the challenge.
19 To examine whether a policy 
reform is successful, one has to address the question “what would have happened to its 
objective(s) if the policy intervention had not been taken place?” The construction of a 
counterfactual is at the core of the policy evaluation problem. To evaluate the capacity 
of a labour market reform to attain a well-defined objective, changes in one indicator 
should ideally identify changes in one policy only. In practice, this is not an easy task 
for several reasons. Firstly, when policy changes concern the nature of labour market 
regulation, these changes are quantifiable only with great difficulty or considerable 
delays. Secondly, when a policy is multidimensional, the information provided by one 
indicator only does not suffice
20. Thirdly, information provided by changes in one 
indicator is not sufficient to evaluate the policy direction when the change in the 
indicator reflects both the exogenous policy interventions and endogenous 
developments. Both (micro- and macro-) evaluation studies require detailed 
information on the characteristics of all measures likely to have an impact on labour 
market performance.  
                                                 
16 Positive interactions can for instance be developed by a) exploiting the role of incentives to work and 
participate in the labour market; b) targeting policies measures to those at risks of inactivity or of social 
exclusion; and c) improving the functioning of policy implementing institutions. 
17 As an example, this type of information could be useful when carrying out cross-sectional analysis on specific 
configurations of labour market institutions (e.g. examining whether the rise in employment rates of older 
workers is linked to tighter access to early retirement schemes). 
18 For instance, for a better understanding of the reforms strategies chosen/adopted at the country level it is 
important to consider the side of the labour market likely to be affected by certain reforms (e.g. labour supply, 
labour demand, matching, etc). 
19 This paragraph draws upon Fertig, M. and Kluve, J. (2004) and on Blundell, R. and Costa Dias M. (2000). 
20 For example, a high net replacement rate with low duration and low coverage provide different incentives than 
the same replacement rate with high duration and high coverage.  
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2.2.   Improving existing tools and developing complementarities with other databases and 
information sources 
 
2.2.1.  Existing datasets at international level 
 
These considerations point to the need to conduct more in-depth analysis on the interaction 
between different sets of policies and labour market institutions. The availability of systematic 
and comprehensive information on reform measures affecting the design of labour market 
institutions then becomes a precondition for a proper understanding of the functioning of the 
labour market. The importance attached to systematically collecting information on labour 
market institutions is not new to the economic literature. International organisations
21 and 
academics have already assembled databases on labour market regulations and labour market 
institutions.  
 
Existing datasets can be divided into two broad categories. A first type collects information on 
enacted reforms, often with the aim of developing indices measuring the reform 
effort/intensity in different policy areas on the basis of predefined criteria (Descriptive 
databases). Based on the collected information, a second type of dataset develops indices 
measuring the overall “stringency” of certain institutions or of the reform intensity (Indicator 
based databases). This type of indicators is more related to the “stock” of existing 
interventions rather than to the “flows” of new measures.
22  
 
However, existing datasets often only cover selected aspects of the labour markets’ 
institutional structure so that a comprehensive picture of reforms is often missing. In addition, 
they rarely cover all EU25 Member States, nor are they regularly updated, so as to provide 
timely enough information for the policy requirements at EU level. A common characteristic 
of most existing databases is that they concentrate on the aggregate qualitative aspects of 
labour market institutions/reforms by providing quantifiable indicators on the strictness of a 
given institution or the intensity of its reform process. However, they usually do not provide a 
detailed description of the characteristics of such institutions or of changes that occur over 
time (enacted reforms).  
 
2.2.2.   Descriptive databases 
A simple collection of reform measures is provided by the database recently developed by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), which covers the fields of minimum wages, 
maternity protection and working time
23. The database includes information on legal 
                                                 
21 See  Boylaud et al. (2000) for the OECD and Rama and Forteza (2000) for the World Bank. 
22 With the aim of studying the institutional determinants of the labour market performance, time-varying 
institutional indicator gathering information from different sources for the twenty OECD countries from 1960 to 
1995 have been developed by Nickell and Nunziata (2001). The institutional variables used in this database 
include an index of employment protection (with a range between 0 and 2, increasing with the strictness of 
employment protection); the benefit replacement rates (average first-year unemployment benefits as a percentage 
of average earnings before tax); a wage bargaining coordination index (ranging from 1 and 3 with 3 being the 
most coordinated); and the tax wedge (the sum of the employment tax rate, the direct tax rate and the indirect tax 
rate). 
23 The database can be accessed freely on the web at the addresses 
www.ilo.org/travaildatabase/servlet/minimumwages ; www.ilo.org/travaildatabase/servlet/maternityprotection  
  - 9 -
definitions and legislative sources of measures adopted in these three policy areas in more 
than 100 countries around the world. No information, however, is provided by the database on 
the scope, content and key characteristics of such measures. Similarly, the NATLEX 
database
24, also developed by the ILO, provides a comprehensive record of abstracts of 
legislation and relevant information of national labour, social security and related human 
rights laws for over 170 countries and territories in the world. 
A recording of information on labour market reforms has been developed by the OECD 
within the framework of the evaluation of the OECD Job Strategy. The database contains 
information on reforms in seven main policy areas
25grouped in two sub-periods (1995-1999 
and 2000-2004)
26. The information is summarised in country notes, but it does not provide a 
detailed description of the characteristics of each reform measure. 
 
The “Social Reforms Database” developed by the Italian Rodolfo De Benedetti Foundation
27 
provides information on reform measures adopted in some European countries. It 
complements the OECD indicators as it provides more insights on qualitative features of 
institutions and on the political opposition to reforms. The database collects information about 
reforms adopted in the EU15 in three broad policy areas - employment protection legislation; 
pension systems; unemployment/ non-employment benefits - over the period 1986-2002, 
while a newly created section on migration policy covers reforms adopted between 1990 and 
2005. The “Social Reforms Database” contains a short institutional description of each reform 
and provides a broad categorization of reforms into two groups, concerning the scope of the 
enacted reforms - structural vs. marginal - and their expected effects, going in the direction of 
either increasing or decreasing labour market flexibility. This categorization places the dataset 
half way between a pure descriptive dataset and an indicator-based one.
 28 
 
2.2.3 Indicator-based databases  
 
This group of institutional datasets does not provide information on the reform measures 
affecting the design of labour market institutions, but concentrates on the characteristics of 
labour market institutions themselves, measured by means of quantitative indicators (scoring 
index for qualitative variables and “aggregate” measure for quantitative variables). Two types 
of indicators have been devised. The first one tries to measure the reform effort through the 
change in institutions likely to be related to governmental measures (indicators measuring 
reform intensity). The second type focuses on measuring the level of stringency of existing 
                                                                                                                                                         
and www.ilo.org/travaildatabase/servlet/workingtime.  Searches can be performed by country, region, subject 
and text. 
24 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex_browse.home?p_lang=en 
25 These are labour taxes; employment protection legislation for both regular and temporary contracts; 
unemployment benefits; active labour market policies; early retirement, invalidity schemes and old-age pensions; 
industrial relations and wage settings; working time flexibility and part-time work. 
26 See OECD (2005) for the most recent version of this database. 
27 http://www.frdb.org 
28 Among the other databases providing general information on reform measures, it is worth mentioning the 
International Reform Monitor project of the Bertelsmann Foundation, reporting on social policy, labour market 
and industrial relations reforms adopted in fifteen OECD countries: http://www.reformmonitor.org  
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labour markets institutions. These indicators measure an “outcome”, which can be due to the 
past and current effect of governmental measures, but can also be due to other variables such 
as labour market practices coming both from employers and employees (such as 
developments in part-time jobs and fixed term contracts). The link with labour market reforms 
can be indirect and blurred by implementation delays and lagged effects.  
 
•  indicators measuring the reform intensity: they measure the reform effort through the 
change in institutions suppose to be related to governmental measures. A set of 
quantitative indicators on the reform efforts has been recently computed by the OECD 
from the aforementioned descriptive database developed for the evaluation of the 
OECD Job Strategy. A large effort has been put into coding qualitative information so 
as to construct quantitative indicators of reform progress in each area and also in 
aggregate for all seven areas together. This provides an overview of cross-country 
differences in reform efforts between 1994 and 2004. As such, the OECD database 
contains a great deal of useful information on the characteristics of labour market 
institutions at specific points in time. However, this inventory does not provide 
information on key design characteristics of reforms (e.g. targeting of reform, 
presence of measures to ensure enforceability, etc.) nor on their implementation. 
 
•  indicators measuring the level of stringency of existing labour markets institutions: 
these types of indicators were mainly developed by the OECD and capture important 
dimensions of the labour market regulation, such as the protection of regular and 
temporary work
29. While providing a reasonable proxy for the extent of government 
intervention in the labour market, these indicators raise a number of measurement 
issues: for instance, they fail to capture the degree of enforcement of specific 
regulations
30. Botero et al. (2004) develop measures of labour market regulations in 85 
countries and correlate them with a number of other potential determinants of labour 
regulations and some labour market outcomes, to demonstrate the validity of the 
principal theories of the determinants of labour regulation.
31 These measures are 
presented as indices of employment laws (five variables)
32; collective relation laws 
(three variables) and social security laws (four variables) where higher values indicate 
greater extent of labour regulation. The approach adopted in the Global Labour Survey 
(GLS) database
33, focussing on implementation rather than on the regulation itself, 
contrasts with the work by Botero et al. (2004), which embraces a de jure approach to 
labour provisions. The GLS database, which is the result of an internet-based survey 
conducted in 2004 under the auspices of the Labour and Work-life Programme (LWP) 
                                                 
29 For a description of the OECD indicator of employment protection legislation and its limits see OECD (2004). 
30 See Bertola, Boeri and Cazes (1999) and IMF (2003). 
31 Legal theories “hold that the patterns of regulation are shaped by each country’s legal tradition”, as opposed to 
the efficiency theory according to which “institutions adjust to serve the needs of a society most efficiently” and 
the political power theory which holds that labour market institutions “are shaped by those in power to benefit 
themselves at the expense of those out of power”. Source: Botero et al. (2004). 
32 The sub-indices of employment laws used by Botero et al. are: alternative employment contracts, cost of 
increasing hours worked, cost of firing workers, dismissal procedures and an employment law index measuring 
protection of labour and employment as an average of previous variables. 
33 Chor D., R. Freeman (2005).  
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at the Harvard Labour School, seeks to measure de facto labour practices around the 
world covering aspects of labour institutions such as employment regulations, 
employee benefits (including pension schemes, sickness benefits and unemployment 
insurance), labour market (including wage-setting, enforcement of minimum wage 
policies, gender discrimination) and the prevalence of collective bargaining. The 




3.  Coverage and structure of the LABREF Database 
 
3.1. General design of the database 
 
3.1.1. Coverage   
 
LABREF is a descriptive database explicitly designed to complement the existing datasets 
and aims at closing specific information gaps. Without providing an in-depth evaluation of 
labour market institutions and reforms of each Member States, the database aims at 
systemically collecting information on measures affecting labour market institutions. 
LABREF records the main ex ante features of measures enacted that help to identify the scope 
of the reform and its cost-effectiveness
35. The scope of the reform is defined with respect to 
the formal broadness of the measure (i.e. if it’s part of a long-term policy package), its 
deepness (i.e. the measure is valid for both incumbents and new entrants) and its political 
support (proxied by the level of involvement of social partners in the reform process). The 
cost-effectiveness is identified by the presence of targeting of groups such as those at risks of 
unemployment or inactivity and/or by some indication of potential costs in the public budget.  
 
Inspired by this literature
36, the LABREF database covers nine main broad policy fields, 
corresponding to as many labour market institutions and subdivided into 36 areas of policy 
intervention (see box below). The fields covered by the database broadly reflect the 
classification employed in OECD (1999), with the addition of labour mobility and migration 
policies. They include: 1) labour taxation, 2) unemployment and welfare-related benefits, 3) 
active labour market programmes (ALMPs), 4) employment protection legislation (EPL) for 
both permanent and temporary contracts, 5) early retirement and disability schemes, 6) 
pension systems, 7) wage bargaining framework, 8) working time organisation, 9) migration 
policies and labour mobility. These fields do not exhaust of course the entire set of policies 
with an impact on labour market performance, but cover the main institutional determinants 
of labour market outcomes. 
 
                                                 
34 More limited efforts to report a scoring of labour market practices over the world are regularly conducted as 
part of two surveys on economic freedom and competitiveness, respectively conducted by the Fraser Institute 
and the World Economic Forum (World Bank “Doing Business” database). Under the section on labour 
regulation, the Fraser Institute’s “Economic Freedom around the World” index (2005) provides an index 
consisting of five indicators calculated over the period 1980-2003: impact of minimum wage, flexibility in hiring 
and firing, level of collective bargaining, unemployment insurance; use of military conscripts. 
35 Ex ante features are those expected from the enacted legislation or regulation, as opposed to those actually 
seen when the reform is implemented. 
36 See for instance de Koning et al., (2001); van Ours (2003); Layard and Nickell (1999).  
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The focus of the database is - as explained above - on the provision of information on a 
number of specific characteristics of enacted reforms, which are likely to shed some light on 
their design, scope, on the effectiveness of their implementation and on their durability (e.g. 
presence of a broad policy package, existence of policy complementarities or of potentially 
conflicting policy measures over time, etc.). A set of thirteen key characteristics has been 
identified to this effect. 
 
3.1.2.  How the data is recorded in LABREF 
 
The LABREF database has been developed by DG ECFIN and the LMWG. Sources used to 
compile the LABREF database include the already mentioned ILO database, the information 
on Member States’ developments published by the EIRO (European Industrial Relations 
Observatory) of the Dublin Foundation for the Improvement of Working and Living 
Conditions, the OECD and IMF country reports, the National Action Plans for Employment 
annually set-up in the framework of the Employment Strategy
37, national legislation and other 
information publicly available on the websites of the Ministries for Employment and Social 
Affairs. 
 
The measures reported in the database refer to information on enacted legislation, as well as 
other public acts of general scope (such as decisions of public authorities or general court 
decisions) likely to have an impact on labour market performance, including measures 
entailing changes in the implementation framework of a previously adopted reform. In 
addition, reported reforms also encompass collective agreements, provided that they are likely 
to affect a large proportion of employees or to engender a change of regime in the medium 
term (for instance, the innovative company agreements in Germany). Collective agreements 
covered by the database include cross-industry agreements, tripartite agreements (involving 
government, trade unions and employers’ federations) and sector-level collective agreements, 
whenever the agreement concluded in one sector is likely to set the patterns for negotiations in 
other sectors. The database does not record information on discussions of possible/ planned 
reforms or law bills not yet formalised. 
 
A single measure may cover several areas of policy intervention and therefore be recorded 
several times. What matters is not the format of the measure itself, but rather the different 
policy actions it involves. For example, if a measure establishes a reduction in the social 
security contributions for the low skilled and the modernisation of the public employment 
services, then these will be considered as two different reforms in the database and the 








                                                 
37 Starting from October 2005, the NAP have become National Strategy Reports, encompassing in one single 
policy document the three strands of the renewed Lisbon Strategy (macro-economic, micro-economic and 
employment policies).  
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Overview of the LABREF database 
 
The database covers 9 main types of reforms’ areas corresponding to 36 areas of intervention grouped as 
follows: 
•  Labour taxation 
o  Employers’ social security contributions 
o  Employees’ social security contributions 
o  Income tax 
 
•  Unemployment and welfare related benefits 
o  Unemployment benefits 
  Net replacement rate 
  Duration of unemployment benefits  
  Coverage (number of people or sectors of the economy covered) 
  Entitlement (eligibility rules, job availability requirements) 
o  Other benefits 
  In-work benefits (employment conditional benefit or tax credit) 
  Means-tested benefits (housing, social assistance) 
 
•  Active labour market programmes 
o  Public Employment Services (job assistance, job-counselling etc) 
o  Training 
o  Direct job creation and employment subsidies 
o  Other schemes 
 
•  Job protection 
o  Permanent contracts 
  Procedural requirements  
  Notice and severance payments 
  Restrictions dismissal  
o  Temporary contracts 
  Maximum number of renewals  
  Maximum duration  
 
•  Pension Systems 
o  Early retirement 
o  Disability schemes 
o  Pensions  
  Level  
  Eligibility 
  Coverage 
  Tax treatment  
  Contributions 
  Other  
 
•  Wage Bargaining  
o  Statutory minima 
o  Contractual Flexible arrangements (e.g. performance related pay)  
o  Government intervention in wage bargaining (e.g. social pacts or extension clauses)  
 
•  Working time  
o  Participation friendly schemes  
o  Working time organisation over the life time (e.g. working time accounts; part-time 
work arrangements for older workers; sabbatical leaves etc). 
 
•  Immigration and mobility  
o  Immigration 
  Border controls  
  Selective Immigration policies  
  Measure to facilitate labour market integration of immigrants 
o  Mobility (Housing, social security portability; degree recognition etc)  
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The main features of reforms recorded in LABREF are: 
1.  General description of the measure: A reform measure should be described in sufficient detail. 
Reforms are not limited to legislative changes only, and may also entail changes in the 
implementation framework. In this case, it is specified that the measure implements a previous 
decision. 
2.  Reference (Budget law, decree, law or other). This corresponds to the text establishing the measure.  
3.  Information source concretely used to fill the database can be, for instance, OECD, EIRO website, 
NAPs or other national sources. 
4.  Year of adoption: the date when a reform measure is legally enacted. The database does not provide 
for the recording of information on planned reforms. 
5.  Timing of implementation (i.e. entry in force, phasing-in schedule). This corresponds to the scheduled 
or expected timing of the implementation and not to the date of the enactment of the measure (which 
refers to question n°4). While changes in labour codes tend to be unique events (although spread over 
time), changes in contributions, taxes and benefits occur more frequently. Both measures can be taken 
gradually or in one stage. 
Detailed features of the reform design 
6.  Direct budgetary costs for general government: As a first option here appears only information from 
national authorities. 
7.  Socio-economic groups targeted, i.e. young, older worker, low wage earners, low skilled, female, 
long term unemployed.  
8.  Is the measure applied to new entrants only or also to current incumbents? A key issue is also to 
know if the measure is “marginal” concerning only the inflows (the new comers or current 
incumbents only) or “substantial”, affecting both the “stock” and the new-comers, i.e. all persons 
affected by institutions/policy measures. This has an impact of the effect of the measure and it may 
reflect its political feasibility. 
9.  Are enforcement and monitoring procedures put in place? Is an ex-post evaluation foreseen? If so, is 
the assessment carried out by the government or by some independent organisation? This 
information might be difficult to find in many instances. 
10.  In order to be implemented does the reform require policy interventions in related areas? The 
existence of conflicting measures in related area or insufficient resources allocated because of budget 
constraints might hamper or delay a satisfactory implementation of the measure. Therefore, these 
problems should be tackled to allow for an actual implementation of reforms which require a joint 
policy intervention. 
11.  Is the measure embedded in a formal long-term policy programme, and is the reform part of a reform 
package. These questions are important as a characterisation of whether labour market reforms are 
comprehensive and designed to exploit the possible complementarities with other measures. 
12.  Is there an involvement of the social partners? If so, do they have an active role or a passive 
(consultative) role? Do they agree on the measure? A reform may be carried out through 
governmental action solely, governmental action with social partners’ consultations, tripartite 
agreement or social partners’ agreement. An active involvement of social partners often makes the 
measure more acceptable and therefore less subject to a risk of being reversed. 
13.  Main impact: on L
d, L
s, w or matching of unemployed with vacancies? This question relates to the 
channel through which the reform operates. It refers to the direct effects and should ideally focus on 
the short-term impact.  
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3.2. The policy areas covered by the LABREF database 
 
3.2.1. Labour  taxation 
 
To cover the main determinants of labour taxes, the LABREF database collects information 
on reforms affecting social security contributions both for employers and employees, as well 
as personal income taxes. The impact of labour taxes on labour market performance remains a 
subject of debate
38. Taxes on labour put a wedge between product wage paid by firms and the 
consumption wage received by employees. The effect on employment depends on real wage 
resistance (i.e. whether or not the real net wage moves to compensate increases/declines in the 
labour tax). In this case the labour costs and the labour demand remain unchanged. Moreover, 
as long as taxes and social contributions treat different incomes (either unemployment 
benefits or labour income) equally taxation should not affect employment
39 . The same holds 
in theory when workers consider the link between their current and future benefits and the 
taxes or social contributions paid by them. However, in practice these effects are less obvious 
as tax system differentiate different income sources, workers do not perceive the links 
between taxation or social contributions and benefits, and real wages do not adjust to changes 
in taxation.  
 
3.2.2.  Unemployment and welfare-related benefits 
 
The LABREF database collects information on the design characteristics of reforms adopted 
in the field of unemployment benefits concerning both the replacement rate and duration of 
benefits, and the eligibility conditions set for having access to/keeping such benefits. 
Economic theory and empirical research
40 suggest that relatively high unemployment benefits 
and relatively long benefit duration, insofar as they reduce the gap between labour and non- 
labour income, reduce job-search incentives and the willingness of the unemployed to accept 
a job.  In addition, more generous unemployment benefits (both levels and duration) may put 
upwards pressure on the reservation wage and ultimately increase the wage pressure. In both 
cases they worsen the employment chances of those looking for a job. On the other hand, as 
long as they subsidise search, they allow job-seekers more time to look for a better job, 
improving the matching between unemployed and vacancies. The evidence suggests that 
eligibility conditions and job-search requirements can be even more important than the level 
of benefits. Also the threat of losing benefits if a job offer is not accepted tends to raise the 
incentive to search.
41 More in general, a system with monitoring and sanctions restores search 
incentives most effectively, thus allowing for higher benefits than otherwise.  
 
                                                 
38 While a number of empirical studies have found that high labour taxes tend to have an adverse impact on 
labour market outcomes (Belot and van Ours (2001), Nickell (1997)), some are less conclusive (Scarpetta 
(1996), Nunziata (2003)) and others have found an interaction of labour taxes with other institutions such as the 
level of centralisation/ co-ordination of wage bargaining settings (Daveri and Tabellini (2000) and IMF (2003), 
Chapter 4).  
39 Pissarides, C. (1998) and Blanchard, O. (2005). 
40 Scarpetta (1996), Nickell (1998), Elmeskov et al. (1998), Nunziata (2003), IMF (2003). 
41 See for instance Jensen, Rosholm and Svarer (2003).  
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Welfare-related benefits are also a policy area for which information is collected in the 
database. In-work benefits and means-tested benefits are regrouped under this category. In-
work benefit schemes are designed to significantly raise in-work income for low-wage earners 
above out-of-work income levels
42. While they are assumed to have a positive impact on 
incentives to work at low income levels, as soon as they are phased out with increasing 
income levels it may result in high marginal tax rates that generate benefit traps in the low 
income/productivity segment
43, thus negatively affecting the financial returns to work and 
creating an incentive to resort to the shadow economy. More in general, all means-tested 
benefits (e.g. housing benefits, child benefits, etc.) paid to people on low income on the basis 
of a test of income and irrespective of their working position can create disincentives to 
work
44, since people who have an increase in earnings suffer from the withdrawal of benefits 
as their earnings increase. Their effects on the labour market can thus be diverse, also in view 
of their interactions with other make-work-pay policies and out-of-work income support 
schemes, and need to be further studied
45.  
 
3.2.3.  Active labour market programmes  
 
Drawing on the OECD classification of expenditures on ALMPs, the LABREF database 
provides information on ALPMs as concerns: 1) public employment services and 
administration
46; 2) labour market training, including training measures undertaken for 
reasons of labour market policy other than special programmes for youth and the disabled, 
subsidies to employers for enterprise training, training for unemployed adults and those at 
risk, and training for employed adults; 3) direct job creation and employment subsidies 
schemes, including targeted measures to promote or provide employment for unemployed 
persons and other groups specified as labour market policy priorities (other than youth or the 
disabled)
47; 4) special schemes, focusing on youth measures and measures for the disabled. 
 
Active labour market programmes (ALMPs) - including training and retraining, job placement 
and assistance, direct job creation - can play a positive role by improving the efficiency of the 
job-matching process. These programmes can be particularly important for low productivity 
                                                 
42 A definition of in-work benefits is contained in OECD (2005), Chapter 3, according to which “in-work 
benefits are welfare schemes designed to provide income supplement to needy families or individuals on the 
condition that they work”. 
43 See Carone et al. (2004). 
44 For example, means-tested child benefits may contribute to high average effective tax rates distorting female 
participation incentives. 
45 OECD (2005), Chapter 3. On the role of interactions between in-work benefits and other means tested benefits 
for labour market performance see Blundell, R. and H. Honeys (2003). 
46 The following services are included: placement, counselling and vocational guidance; job-search courses and 
related forms of intensified counselling for persons with difficulties in finding employment; support of 
geographic mobility and similar costs in connection with job search and placement.  
 
47 These measures can take different forms: 1) Subsidies to regular employment in the private sector, in the form 
of wage subsidies for the recruitment of targeted workers or, in some cases, for continued employment of 
persons whose jobs are at risk.  Grants aiming primarily to cover enterprises' capital costs are not included, nor 
are general employment subsidies or subsidies paid for all workers in certain regions; 2) Support of unemployed 
persons starting enterprises; 3) Direct job creation (public or non-profit), in the form of temporary work and, in 
some cases, regular jobs in the public sector or in non-profit organisations, offered to unemployed persons.  
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workers that have been priced out of the labour market, insofar as they improve their 
employability. Nevertheless, empirical evidence on their impact on unemployment is 
limited
48. Their effectiveness can also vary to a considerable extent, following the different 
types of programmes implemented, their design and implementation patterns. For instance, 
public job creation and wage subsidy programmes can entail deadweight losses (i.e. 
subsidised jobs are created that would have been created even without the subsidy) and 
substitution effects (firms have an incentive to replace regular work by subsidized labour), 
while their outcomes have sometimes shown being disappointing in terms of bringing the 
unemployed back into unsubsidised work
49.  
 
3.2.4.  Employment protection legislation 
 
The relationship between employment protection legislation (EPL) and unemployment, and 
more in general labour market performance, is ambiguous.
50 Empirical evidence provides 
mixed results on the impact of EPL on labour market performance
51. Researchers also suggest 
that in a setting where restrictive employment protection legislation for workers with 
permanent contracts coexists with more flexible regulation for temporary contracts, the 
bargaining position of the “insiders” on permanent contracts will result strengthened without 
much risk of job losses, while any resulting negative effects on employment will be mainly 
borne by the “outsiders” on fixed-term contracts. Deregulated temporary contracts will 
increase the turnover of this segment of the labour market without representing a window of 
opportunity to more stable work relationships, thus increasing their marginalisation and the 
risk of segmentation of the labour market
52.  
To provide background information on all these issues, the LABREF database looks at policy 
interventions in the area of employment protection legislation for both permanent and fixed-
term contracts. These include notice and severance payments, restrictions of dismissals and 
other procedural requirements for permanent contracts, while the maximum duration and 
maximum number of renewals are recorded as far as fixed-term contracts are concerned. 
 
3.2.5.  Early retirement and disability schemes 
 
There is a wide consensus in the economic literature that generous early retirement and badly 
designed disability schemes have played an important role in distorting the incentives to 
participate in the labour market. A wide array of early retirement and other benefit schemes, 
including disability pensions awarded on the basis of labour market considerations and 
benefits provided, for instance, in exchange for the employment of younger workers, were 
often offered to redundant or unemployed elderly workers in response to severe shocks in the 
                                                 
48 Betcherman, G. (2000). 
49 Martin (2000). 
50 As a result of stricter EPL, dismissals will become more difficult, the bargaining power of insiders will 
increase and firms will be more cautious about filling vacancies. On the other hand, employment relations will 
become more stable and involve higher investment on firm specific human capital, hereby inducing productivity 
and competitiveness gains. The literature on EPL is abundant. See for example the reviews by Nickell, S. (1998, 
2002), Betcherman, G. (2000), Young, D. (2003), OECD (2004) chapter 2 and Dreger, C. et al. (2005).  
51 See OECD (1999). 
52 OECD (2005), Blanchard and Landier (2002). On wage differential between fixed-term and permanent 
contacts see Mertens, A., V. Gash and F. McGinnity (2005) .  
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labour market (lump-of-labour argument). The LABREF database looks at reform measures 
touching both early retirement and disability schemes. In particular, the database collects 
information on reforms modifying eligibility criteria for invalidity and sickness benefits, 
monitoring and sanctions, and their interaction with activation measures.  
 
3.2.6. Pension  systems 
 
Europe’s population will be smaller and older in 2050. While the budgetary risks are well 
know, less attention has been paid on the economic impact of ageing populations. Unless 
offset by a rise in productivity, a decline in the size of working-age population will act as a 
drag on economic growth. Thus, the design of the pension systems plays an important role in 
determining the participation and employment rate of older workers. The LABREF database 
looks at policy interventions having an impact on the level of old-age pension benefits and 
their coverage (concerning specific groups, such as workers in given sectors, those employed 
with atypical contracts, etc.), as well as on the eligibility conditions (age requirements, etc.), 
the contributions paid to the pension system and tax treatment. 
 
3.2.7.  Wage bargaining framework 
 
Under the heading of wage bargaining framework, the LABREF database provides 
information on policy actions concerning the introduction/modification of statutory and 
contractual minimum wages, flexible pay arrangements (e.g. role of performance-related pay, 
bonuses) and government interventions in the wage bargaining process (e.g. extension of 
collective wage agreements or modifications of the collective bargaining/ wage settings). 
There is no consensus among researchers on the impact of minimum wage on employment 
performance, also because of the few cross-country analysis performed so far
53. The 
systematic data collection provided by the database on measures (either under the form of 
legislative acts or collective/ tripartite agreements) fixing statutory or contractual minimum 
wages could therefore provide useful insights to this respect. This information, together with 
data collected on government interventions in the field of wage bargaining settings and on 
flexible pay arrangements, could also be used as an indicator of the evolution of the wage 
setting mechanisms proper to the different bargaining systems.  
 
Some authors
54 suggest in fact that bargaining systems which are either highly centralised at 
national or cross-industry level or decentralised at the level of firms perform better in terms of 
employment rates than intermediate systems where bargaining takes place at sector level
55. 
Nevertheless, both this causal relationship between the level of centralisation of wage 
bargaining systems and the unemployment rate and the theoretical assumptions on the impact 
of minimum wage on labour market performance (that a minimum wage always costs jobs) 
are being put into question by more recent literature and empirical analysis
56. Consensus is in 
                                                 
53 See Betcherman, G. (2000) and Dolado, J., F. Felgueroso and J.F. Jimeno. 
54 For an excursus of literature see European Commission, 2004. 
55 The main advantage of centralised bargaining would be that it allows the social partners to internalise the 
negative impact of excessive wage claims on overall employment and to provide a stronger wages’ response to 
changing macroeconomic conditions, thus leading to economy-wide wage moderation.  Decentralised 
bargaining, on the other hand, would mean that wages adjust better to local productivity and labour market 
conditions. The wage compression resulting from a highly coordinated bargaining system could yet intervene at 
the expenses of the young and/or low-wage workers. A similar effect might be expected for minimum wages. 
56 See for all Forni, L. (2004).  
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fact growing on the fact that judiciously chosen minimum wages (for instance with different 
rates fixed across sectors and ages) might be expected to improve labour market attachment 
without reducing employment, thus successfully supporting other make-work-pay policies.  
 
3.2.8.  Working time organisation (WTO) 
 
The LABREF database provides information on enacted measures that affect work 
organisation from three points of view: 1) participation friendly schemes, aimed at better 
combining private and professional life - which are expected to conduct to higher labour 
market participation; 2) schemes concerning the working-time organisation over the life-time 
- such as multi-annual working time accounts, favourable part-time work arrangement for 
older worker, or sabbatical leaves for studies or personal reasons - which aim at reorganising 
the career-time; 3) flexible working time arrangement which allow firms to adapt working 
hours more easily and with lower costs, so as to improve work organisation and productivity 
at the firm level and ultimately to make room for more employment creation.  
 
3.2.9. Immigration and labour mobility policies 
 
Since the numbers of third-country nationals make a growing contribution to the total labour 
force and employment rates in several Member States, the database also provides information 
on immigration policies likely to affect the labour market outcomes as far as immigrant 
workers are concerned. Policy interventions covered by the database include: 1) Border 
controls, encompassing measures related to the entry, stay and access to the labour market, 
measures for users of clandestine labour force and their enforcement and regularisation 
programmes; 2) Selective immigration policies, including quota systems aimed at the 
recruitment of foreign workers, easing of recruiting policies for highly skilled or for specific 
occupations, bilateral labour agreements on seasonal or temporary workers; 3) Measures to 
facilitate the labour market integration of immigrants, ranging from ALMPs to the recognition 
of formal education attainments and the entitlement to benefits/ social assistance programmes 
specifically targeted at immigrant workers (and asylum seekers). 
 
Labour mobility policies have been included in the database as a separate item, aiming at 
improving the conditions for workers to take up a job which is distant from the main centre of 
interest. This heading include a quite disparate set of measures ranging from those providing 
economic incentives for housing, to the recognition of acquired qualifications and skills or 
improving the portability of supplementary pension rights. 
 
3.3. Features of the reform design 
 
The specific characteristics on the reform measures recorded under the different policy fields 
contained in the database are identified by thirteen descriptive features focusing on the 
institutional characteristics of the reform design.  
3.3.1.   “Main features” 
Under the heading “Main features of the reform”, factual information is collected on the 
general characteristics of the measures enacted. Under this heading, the database provides a 
general description of the provisions contained in the enacted measure, the reference to the 
legal text (or other act) establishing the measure, the information source concretely used to fill 
the database, the year of adoption  and the timing of implementation (i.e. entry into force, 
phasing-in schedule).  
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3.3.2.   “Detailed  features” 
This section of the database reports information on a broad set of features that the economic 
literature widely recognises as “desirable” characteristics in the design of labour market 
institutions. 
A first issue concerns the budgetary impact of labour market reforms. As general rule, a 
policy measure which involves a large amount of public spending should be submitted to a 
proper cost-benefit analysis. To this respect, one has to consider whether the financial burden 
is excessive in the sense that the outcome of the measure in question would have been 
occurred anyway without policy action (deadweight costs) and whether there is a substitution 
of those untouched by the policy intervention with those touched by it either within the same 
employer (substitution effect) or with other employers (displacement effect). Despite the 
importance of these issues, the information available does not allow a precise quantification 
of the budgetary consequences of labour market reforms. The approach followed in the 
database simply reports if in the relevant act (e.g. the budget law) there is any reference to 
direct costs for the public accounts.  
A second question that the literature has addressed as a key variable in labour market 
performance is the issue of targeting. The identification of target groups in the design of 
policy may improve both the effectiveness and the efficiency of the measure implemented. 
Indeed, successful reforms improved labour market performance when they modified the 
participation behaviour of groups with low labour market attachment (women, older workers, 
low skilled). This occurred when activation measures that tightened the eligibility conditions 
for access to the unemployment benefits were combined with targeted  measures directed 
towards groups at risks of inactivity or unemployment
57. The database identifies whether 
policy initiatives are targeted and in this case the “socio-economic groups targeted” by the 
measure in question (e.g. young, older worker, low wage earners, low skilled, female, long 
term unemployed).  
In order to provide a broad picture of the scope of the reform, independently from its 
targeting, the database records whether a single measure applies to new entrants and current 
incumbents only or to both of them.  This information should help to understand if a 
measure is “marginal” - i.e. concerns the inflows (the new comers) or the “stock” (those 
already holding a certain position) only - or “substantial”, i.e. both of them. This has an 
impact of the effectiveness and political feasibility of a certain reform strategy. 
58 For 
example, for the political feasibility of the reform process policy makers may introduce minor 
changes for certain categories only gradually over time.  
Another key question concerns the need for an ex-post evaluation of the measures enacted. 
This is important to fine-tune or, depending on their observed efficiency, even abandon 
unsuccessful measures and reshape labour market policies in the future. Post-evaluation 
analysis can be usefully employed in the initial phase of reforms, to assess whether certain 
undesirable or disappointing outcomes reflect policy design mistakes, implementation lags or 
implementation failures, due for example to the lack of proper functioning labour market 
                                                 
57 E.g. de Koning et al. (2001), van Ours (2003). 
58 Broadening the reform process by enlarging the package of measures and deepening it with respect to specific 
target groups may have advantages and disadvantages. For a discussion of this issues in relation to the labour 
market see Arpaia and Mourre (2005).    
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implementing institutions.
59 The LABREF database gives an answer to the following 
questions: “Are enforcement and monitoring procedures put in place? Is an ex-post evaluation 
foreseen? If so, is the assessment carried out by the government or by some independent 
organisation?”  bearing in mind that this information might be difficult to find in many 
instances. 
It is also interesting to know if we can reasonably expect any positive interactions with other 
policies or, on the contrary, any risk of poor implementation or objective impediment because 
of lack of actions in other related areas of policy intervention. In such a case, problems should 
be tackled to allow for the actual implementation of the reform, which requires a joint policy 
intervention. To this effect, the database asks the question: “In order to be implemented does 
the reform requires policy interventions in related areas?” It is not easy to extract this type of 
information from the documents used to compile the database. However, a comprehensive 
collection of reform measures adopted in a given country and over a reasonable number of 
years can facilitate the difficult task of answering this question.  
The literature on the political economy of structural reform has not achieved a consensus on 
whether a strategy which broadens the reform package has more chances of being successful 
than an approach that introduces marginal reforms without being embedded in a formal 
packaging. The database helps to deepen these issues by collecting information on whether a 
specific measure is part of comprehensive policy package which tackles jointly different 
issues such as flexibility at the intensive and extensive margins, reforms of the benefits 
system and of the active labour market programmes etc. In order to characterise reforms along 
this dimension the database reports whether a measure is embedded in a formal long-term 
policy programme, and is part of a reform package. This information may also help to 
identify whether a certain policy action has been designed to exploit the complementarities 
with other measures. 
Some observers contend that the quality of relations between social partners and between 
them and the policy makers may help in building the necessary trust to gain the consensus for 
a specific reform
60. The involvement of the social partners in the reform design is a relevant 
question for an informed judgement on the feasibility of a reform or on the risks of reversal of 
reforms already enacted. A reform may be carried out through governmental action solely, 
governmental action with social partners’ consultations, tripartite agreement (government and 
social partners) or social partners’ agreement. An active involvement of social partners often 
makes the measure more acceptable and therefore less subject to a risk of being reversed. 
Hence, the database consider if there is an involvement of social partners. In the affirmative 
case, if they have an active or a passive (consultative) role. If they agree on the measures 
enacted.  
Finally, in assessing labour market reforms, it is convenient to consider the channel through 
which the reform operates, distinguishing between measures directed to increase labour 
demand from those which attempt to enhance the labour supply, improve the matching 
process between the demand and supply or potentially have a direct influence on the wages 
formation mechanism. On the basis of ex-ante available information, the database therefore 
                                                 
59 For instance, the lack of synergy between institutions in charge of different tasks but with same targeted group 
can jeopardise the policy efficiency, while the adaptation of policy bodies to local conditions (decentralisation) 
and the participation of civil society and business (partnership), the appropriate number of well-trained and 
qualified staff, may be as useful as the policy definition on paper (OECD, 2003). 
60 Blanchard (2005) and Blanchard-Phillippon (2004).  
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tries to report the expected direct impact of reform measures (on labour demand, labour 
supply, wage formation mechanisms or on the matching of unemployed with vacancies). Of 
course one measure may entail a complex set of responses over time. Hence, long-term and 
indirect effects are not considered. 
 
 
4.  A preliminary illustration of potential use of the database  
 
4.1. Cross-sectional comparisons of the characteristics of the reforms  
 
On the basis of different sources publicly available, the database has been compiled by DG 
ECFIN and cross-checked by the members of the LMWG. With the information collected for 
2004, this section provides an overview of reforms enacted at the Member State level.  
 
With the structure of the LABREF database it is possible to analyse the distribution of the 
measures enacted in 2004 by areas of intervention and specific design characteristics. Each i 
measure has been considered as a single event and classified accordingly in one of the 36 
different areas of policy intervention; the sum over i gives the total number of reforms enacted 
in one country.  
Simple accounting of the measures enacted would be misleading as it would neglect important 
aspects of the reform process. The counting of reforms has been conditioned to the desirable 
characteristics of the reform design. This should provide simple information on the scope of 
the reform (i.e. weather the measure is part of a long term policy package and it is valid for 
both incumbents and new entrance) and its formal cost effective design (i.e. whether the 
measure is targeted to specific groups and the reference documents foresee some budgetary 
costs for the public accounts). Hence, for each characteristic j of the reforms design, we have 
counted the number of measures i with the characteristic j. Since a single measure can have 
more than one characteristic, the sum (over j) of the number of all measures with a specific 
characteristics j is larger than the total number of measures. 
 
The formal dimension captured by the database represents only a first, although important, 
layer of the reform policy. Implementing decrees often follows formal documents establishing 
principles, which implies lags between the policy action and the final outcomes. Hence, cross-
countries comparisons provide only a description de jure of the reform design and not a way 
to rank countries according to the effectiveness and efficiency of the reform.
61 Moreover, the 
description which is provided is based on one year only and, therefore does not capture the 
whole configuration of labour market reforms which usually tend to clearly emerge only over 
time. With these cautions in mind the next section will provide a broad description of the 
measure enacted in 2004.
62  
 
4.1.1.  An overview of reforms enacted in 2004 
 
The following general remarks can be made as regards the characteristics of reforms enacted 
in 2004:  
 
                                                 
61 When backdated to the mid 1990s, the information in the database will give a time perspective of the reform 
process making it possible to study for example its macro-economic determinants. 
62 A more detailed description by field of intervention is provided in section 4.2.  
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•  the majority of policy measures taken in the EU in 2004 were in the area of ALMPs, 
“Taxation”, “Unemployment and welfare related benefits” (Graph 1 and Graph 3). 
Both in the EU10 and EU15 Member States, relatively few initiatives were taken in 
areas such as “Employment Protection Legislation”, “Disability and Early Retirement 
Schemes”, “Labour Mobility”. Policy measures adopted in the field of “Working Time 
Organisation” mainly concerned the introduction of flexible arrangements for 
reconciling work and family life or the possibility to deviate from collective 
agreements to introduce more flexible working time arrangements
63. In the area of 
“Pensions” relatively few were the measures enacted in the EU10 Member States. 
Finally, in more than the EU15 countries, these focussed on interventions aiming at 
improving the functioning of the active labour market policies;  
 
•  for the EU as a whole, the measures enacted were broad in their scope - i.e. they were 
introduced for both the incumbents and the new entrants and embedded in a formal 
long-term policy package - more so in EU15 than EU10 countries (Graph 1 lower 
panels). For the EU15 and the EU10 respectively, about 40% and 50% of all 
interventions in the labour market were recorded as having a direct impact on the 
budget. This does not imply that the remaining measures did not have a budgetary 
effect, as official documents may not report the information required. Finally, the 
probability that the measures enacted are targeted is of about 50% in the EU15 and 
40% in the EU10; 
 
•  as far as the expected effects are concerned, labour supply has been the main focus in 
a large number of countries (the Netherlands, Austria, Lithuania, Malta, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, the UK, Germany Poland, Latvia, Italy, Spain, Sweden, 
Slovenia, Estonia). In contrast, only few countries (in particular the Czech Republic 
and Greece) adopted measures with an expected impact on the labour demand; 
measures with an impact on matching or wages were not only rare, but also 
concentrated in few countries (table 1); 
 
•  the distribution across countries as regards the characteristics of the reforms enacted in 
2004 is very heterogeneous (Graph 2). An indication of the diversity in the measures 
implemented is provided by the variability across countries in the number of measures 
enacted with a certain specific characteristic. In making this comparison, the 
variability in the number of measures with a specific characteristic has been 
normalised relative to the variability in the total number of reforms.
64 There is 
                                                 
63 Measures in this field were adopted in Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Sweden, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta and Slovakia. Schemes that allow the organisation of the 
working life along the career time has been introduced in the Netherlands, while the sabbatical leave scheme 
experimented since 2002 in Sweden, has been extended nation-wide.  
64 In our case we consider 8 characteristics. These are : a) number of reforms embedded; b) number of reforms 
valid to both incumbents and new entrants;  c) number of targeted reforms; d) number of reforms which foresee 
an impact on the public budget; e) number of reforms with an expected impact on the labour demand; f) number 
of reforms with an expected impact on the labour supply; g) number of reforms with an expected impact on 
matching; h) number of reforms with an expected impact on wages. As measures of variability we use the 
coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the mean). This measure has been normalised by the 
coefficient of variation for the total number of reforms. Formally: CV(number of reforms with specific 
characteristic)/CV(total number of reforms). For the number of measures applied to both incumbents and new 
entrants this index is of about the same order than that for the number of measures with an expected impact on 
the “Labour Supply” (i.e. 1). In words the variability across country of the number of measures applied to both 
incumbents and new entrants is similar to the variability of the total number of reforms. This contrasts with a  
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evidence of much more homogeneity across countries in reforms that are enacted for 
both the incumbents and the new entrants than in any other reform’s characteristic;
65  
 
•  More than 50% of all measures enacted in 2004 were embedded in a long term policy 
package in Poland, Belgium, Italy, the UK, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovakia 
and Finland. Targeted measures are common in countries such as Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Denmark, and the UK. Finally, measures with expected 
direct budgetary costs for the government are found in countries such as Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Slovenia, Malta, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia and the UK. 
                                                                                                                                                         
value of the index of 4 for the measures with an expected impact on wages; i.e. the variability is in this case four 
time higher than in the unconditional number of reforms. For the other characteristics the value of the index is 
3.2 for measures with an expected impact on the “Labour Demand”; 2.4 for measures “Embedded in a long term 
policy package or that are expected to have an impact on the matching; 1.5 for the targeted measures or those 
that whose reference documents foresee some impact on the budget. 
65 Of course this holds under the assumption that the number of measures applied to both incumbents and new 
entrants is a good proxy of the broadness of the reforms enacted.     
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Graph 1  Distribution of reforms by reform area and by reform characteristics in the EU: 2004 
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Belgium 5  1  1 0  0  0  0 0 0  0  7 
Denmark 3  1  3  0  0  1  1  2  1  0  12 
Germany   0  2  2  0  1  2  1  1  1  0  10 
Greece 1  1  4  3  1  3 1  0  1 0  15 
Spain   2  0  3  0  0  4  2  1  2  1  15 
France 3 1  4 1  0  0  3 2 1  0  15 
Ireland 1  2  2  0  0  0 1  1  1 0  8 
Italy 1  0  3 1  0  4  0 2 2  0  13 
Luxembourg 1  1  2  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  5 
Netherlands 1  1  1  0  2  1  1  1  2  0  10 
Austria   2  3  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  1  10 
Portugal 2  0  3  1  0 0  1  0  3  0  10 
Finland   2  1  8  0  0  1  1  0  2  0  15 




3 6  1  0  3  2  0  2  0  17 
Cyprus 0  0  2  0  0  0 2  0  0 0  4 
Czech 
Republic   5 
5 
4 2  0  0  0 0 0  0  16 
Estonia 2  0  2  0 0  0  3  1  1 0  9 
Hungary   3  0  2  0  0  1  1  1  1  0  9 
Latvia 1 1  0  0  0  1 0  0  0  0  3 
Lithuania 5  1  4  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  11 
Malta 2  3  4 0  0  0  1  1 0  1  12 
Poland 2 2  5  0  2  0 1  0  0 0  12 
Slovakia 0  3  3  0  0 0  1  2  0  0  9 
Slovenia   1  0  3  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  5 
Total EU-25  46  34  74  9  6  22  26  19  21  5  262 
Total EU-15  25  19  45  7  4  20  16  13  19  4  172 
Total AC-10  21  15  29  2  2  2  10  6  2  1  90  
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Graph 2  Characteristics of the reform enacted in the Member States in 2004  
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4.2. Detailed features: description of measures enacted in 2004 
4.2.1. Labour  taxation 
 
Most measures adopted in 2004 in the field of labour taxation were aimed at reducing the tax 
burden on labour, so as to stimulate employment by lowering labour costs, to make work 
more attractive for low-income workers to and avoid 'unemployment traps'. 
 
In Belgium, a simplification occurred of the various schemes to reduce employers’ social 
security contributions for several focus groups. The new scheme foresees a structural rebate 
focused mainly on low-income workers, to be supplemented with a reduction of €400 or 
€1000 per quarter aimed at more specific target groups, such as low-skilled workers, older 
employees and long-term unemployed. In order to improve visibility of tax credits on 
employees’ income, the government also planned to gradually introduce a 'Work Bonus' in 
2005-2007, replacing the tax-credit with an increased rebate of social security contributions 
for low-income workers. Significant reductions in employers’ social security contributions 
(from 20% to 100%) were also introduced  
 
•  in Hungary, Poland and Spain for businesses hiring employees among the groups with 
the highest difficulties to join the labour market (school levers, unemployed over 50, 
women with disabilities, etc.); 
 
•    in France for employers providing personal services to individuals and for those 
operating in the HORECA sector concerning their low-wage employees; 
 
•   and in Spain, for case of conversion of fixed-term contracts into permanent ones. 
 
In other countries, action in the field of labour taxation took the form of reductions of 
employees’ income taxes, especially for low-income earners. In some countries, this was done 
through the reduction of the number of tax brackets at a slightly lower level on average 
(Austria, Hungary) and the definition of a tax-free zone for gross incomes under a given 
threshold (Austria, Latvia). In other countries, this translated into a significant extension of 
the upper bound of the tax-bracket with the lowest tax rate (Denmark) or the introduction/ 
extension of tax credits for low-income earners (Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Finland, 
Latvia, the Netherlands, Slovenia)
66. In 2004, Sweden continued implementing its green tax 
shift strategy, whereby taxes on energy are increased while taxes on labour are reduced. 
 
Specific tax incentives were introduced to boost training activities in Estonia, to facilitate tele-
working in Hungary and to encourage the development of household service work in Finland 
and specific job creation activities in Finland, Spain and Lithuania (e.g. social enterprises). A 
tax exemption was introduced in Malta for women who have been absent from work for more 
than five years. 
 
                                                 
66 It is estimated in the Danish NAP for Employment 2004, that the tax reductions and “employment allowance” 
(tax credit) introduced in Denmark will increase the labour force up to 10-12,000 full-time employees in total: 
the introduction of the “employment allowance” is expected to increase employment by 3,500 units in the longer 
term and the higher income limit for middle-bracket taxation is expected to increase the supply of labour mainly 
through an increase in longer average working hours.  
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In some countries (Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Portugal), measures were adopted aimed 
at combating undeclared work, including a tightening of the conditions for entitlement to 
unemployment benefits, inspection activities, more effective PES activities concerning 
placement and record of job-seekers, creation of specific databases. 
 
4.2.2.  Unemployment and welfare-related benefit systems 
  
In the area of unemployment and welfare related-benefits, various measures were taken which 
aimed at more targeted interventions, stricter controls and tighter eligibility conditions. In the 
design of these measures, the complementarities and interactions with activation policies were 
reinforced. At the same time, access to benefits was widened to take account of the growing 
importance of atypical forms of employment. The sickness systems were reformed in the 
direction of a stronger insurance component. 
 
A system of regular check-ups for people receiving unemployment benefits was set up in 
Belgium with the aim of improving participation rates and employability of the jobless 
through training and counselling, or ultimately through financial sanctions. Under the new 
system, unemployed persons who no longer actively look for a job and refuse the newly 
available training or counselling actions, can lose part of their unemployment benefits. 
 
In the Slovak Republic, the replacement rate level of unemployment and other social benefits 
was reduced and the conditions of access to benefits tightened. Such measures were 
accompanied by activation policies (set in the framework of the New Employment Strategy 
adopted in 2003). In particular, an ‘activation allowance’ was introduced for unemployed 
people who work at least 10 hours a week, participate in community volunteer work or 
retraining programmes, in addition to social benefits that they may receive. In Poland, the 
maximum duration over which unemployment benefits can be paid out has been reduced from 
12 to 6 months in all areas where the unemployment rate does no exceed 125% of the national 
average, while unemployed taking up a job paying less than the minimum wage were allowed 
to continue drawing a proportion of his/her unemployment benefit. In the Czech Republic, a 
slight increase in the level of unemployment benefits and the extension of the standard 
duration of unemployment for older workers (from 6 to 9 months for unemployed older than 
50 and to 12 months for those older than 55) were accompanied by tighter eligibility criteria 
and stricter registration and reporting requirements with labour offices. As in Poland, 
unemployed who earn up to half of the minimum wage were allowed to keep their 
unemployment benefits. 
 
With the aim of activating unemployed people and in particular the long-term unemployed, 
wide-ranging measures were adopted in Germany under the “Hartz IV” reform package. The 
unemployment assistance scheme and the social assistance scheme were merged into the 
Unemployment Benefit II Programme, involving substantial cuts in the unemployment 
benefits, approximately at the level of social assistance (up to € 345 per month in the first 6 
months of 2005 for singles or single parents in Western Germany and € 331 in Eastern 
Germany, plus cost of "adequate" housing). Cuts in the duration of unemployment benefits 
were also introduced, with effect from 2006
67, and job acceptance requirements for eligibility 
                                                 
67 Prior to 2006, 12 up to 32 month of full unemployment pay (60-67% of previous salary) were followed by 
unemployment benefits of 53-57% of the last net salary (Arbeitslosenhilfe). From 2006 on, reception of the full 
unemployment pay (Arbeitslosengeld I) is restricted to 12 months in general and 18 months for over-55-year-
olds. This will be followed by the Arbeitslosengeld II (usually much lower) if the claimant fits the requirements 
(depending on savings, life insurance and household income).  
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to unemployment benefits tightened and enforced more strictly. In particular, recipients of the 
new benefits will be obliged to accept any legal job offer, regardless of the level of pay. If a 
recipient rejects a job, he/she will have to face sanctions in the form of a reduction of 
unemployment benefits for a limited period of time. Under the new rules adopted in 
September 2004, job seekers have also access to a standardised and integrated system of 
provision of welfare benefits and active assistance at local level. The long-term unemployed 
and young people under the age of 25 have access to special assistance in the form of training, 
employment or qualification measures, while, to encourage the long-term unemployed to take 
a first step back to work, a new category of low-paying jobs was introduced to supplement 
welfare benefits. These job opportunities are offered to the unemployed by their local 
counsellor (i.e. the local PES) against a small hourly compensation (1 to 2 € per hour), 
intended to top up the welfare checks they already get, without replacing the jobs offered on 
the labour market. If such a job offer is not accepted, they may loose or have reduced their 
social assistance. 
 
The unemployment insurance coverage was extended to all categories of self-employed 
persons, against a reduced rate of social security contributions, in Austria and the Czech 
Republic. In Austria, the maximum spell of temporary employment allowing access to 
unemployment benefits was extended, a measure which will widen the coverage 
unemployment benefits for occasional workers. 
 
With the goal of reducing the level of sickness absence, Sweden extended the responsibility of 
employers in co-financing sickness costs of their employees and introduced a special health-
insurance fund. In the Czech Republic, the insurance aspect of the sickness insurance scheme 
was also enhanced while stricter rules on the entitlement to sickness benefits were introduced.  
 
Means-tested benefits (Austria, Lithuania, Malta, UK) and in-work benefits (Ireland, Latvia, 
UK) were focused on the support to maternity and low-income families with children, single 
parents and sole earners. 
 
A number of countries introduced new provisions for the protection of workers at risk of 
dismissal in case of company restructuring.  Financial support and accompanying activation 
measures were introduced in the Czech Republic and Finland.  In Belgium, measures adopted 
to facilitate the re-employment of workers recently laid-off as a result of company 
restructuring included a reduction of employers and employees' social security contributions 
and subsidising advice and training. In Sweden, a new "adjustment insurance" scheme was 
introduced providing monetary support (AGB) to blue-collar older workers faced with 
collective or individual redundancy in a situation of "work shortage".  Moreover, under such a 
new scheme, all workers who have been employed by one or more companies covered by the 
AGB insurance for at least one year may receive also an individual "adjustment support", 
providing help with education/ training, job assistance, business start-up advice.  In Ireland, 
the weekly ceiling of redundancy compensation set by collective agreement was raised, in 
conformity with the three-year “Sustaining Progress National Partnership” agreement of 2003. 
 
4.2.3.  Active Labour Market Policies  
 
Major restructuring of the public employment services and boosting of activation measures 
took place in a large number of Member States in 2004, often in the framework of wider 
reform packages. The EU10 countries conducted the most comprehensive reforms. 
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In some countries, this involved the setting up/extension/strengthening of the activities of 
integrated service centres for local authorities and other service providers offering a variety of 
personalised activating services for difficult to employ job-seekers, young people and long-
term unemployed (Denmark, Finland, Ireland). 
 
In the UK, a new plan was announced aimed at further individualisation of the services 
provided by the “Jobcentres Plus”. The proposals will give local job advisors and managers 
greater power to tailor support to meet individual needs, and to direct resources to priority 
groups. 
 
In France, the measures introduced in the framework of the "Social Cohesion Plan” provided 
a clearer and better coordinated range of local services for the most vulnerable, through the 
setting up of 300 local ‘employment centres’ having the mission of identifying quantitative 
and qualitative job needs, providing a structure for training, ensuring the monitoring of 
unemployed people in difficult circumstances and bringing together in a single 'public-interest 
partnership' all relevant parties, including the body responsible for paying out unemployment 
benefit. The PES monopoly over job placement was abolished and the market opened up to 
new private job placement operators. A special scheme for youth employment was also 
created, providing individual support to young unqualified unemployed, while an 'access 
pathway' to jobs in the local and regional government, hospital and central government civil 
service will enable 100,000 disadvantaged young people to be recruited in the civil service via 
combined study and on-the-job training programmes.  Moreover, one million 'employment 
starter contracts' (contrats d’activité), consisting of 26-35 hours’ employment per week split 
between work and training will be available over a period of four years for people who have 
been recipients of social security allowances or minimum income for six months, and for 
people receiving single parent’s allowance. 
 
The PES reform measures adopted in the EU10 represented a dramatic overhaul of the 
traditional employment services’ operating model. Emphasis is now being put on activation 
measures rather than on welfare, and there are efforts to move away from dispensing 
unemployment benefits to becoming active providers of counselling, job-search and 
placement assistance services. 
 
In the Czech Republic and Poland, key reforms adopted in 2004 opened-up the job placement 
services to private employment agencies and provided for the expansion of their activities 
which now include training, personalised career counselling, assistance to active job-seeking, 
better support to job-seekers with disabilities and strengthened co-operation with other entities 
operating on the labour market. In Poland, so-called “social contracts” were introduced to 
improve the cooperation between employment services and social assistance services and to 
ensure that the unemployed taking advantage of social assistance put the right effort in job 
seeking activities. 
 
Actions planned in Estonia, Malta and Cyprus included the extension and diversification of 
active labour market measures to be performed by the PES, with particular attention for the 
long-term unemployed and people with disabilities, and the implementation of personalised 
guidance and training services. A programme for the development of PES was decided in 
Hungary. Labour exchange information systems were developed in Italy, Lithuania and 
Cyprus. 
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A great deal of attention was also paid to the development of the vocational and training 
activities. In Finland, specific measures were adopted aimed at boosting on-the-job training, 
co-financed by the labour offices and the employers and supported through activation 
measures. An increase in the volume of active labour market training was also foreseen in 
Sweden, while new activation and vocational training programmes were introduced in 
Cyprus, Hungary, Malta and Slovenia. A new family of Apprenticeship Programmes was 
adopted in the UK, complemented by a new series of accompanying measures such as 
developing skills passports, improving mechanisms of financial support for those for whom 
training provides a route back to work, extending employers’ benefits in this field. 
 
Lithuania, Malta and Estonia introduced employers’ incentives to invest in continuing 
vocational training. In Poland, training funds self-financed by employers for the vocational 
training of their employees were introduced. Measures adopted in Portugal to boost training 
included a training obligation for employers vis-à-vis their minor employees admitted to work 
and the right to financial compensation for both, as well as an obligation for employers to 
ensure access to vocational training for fixed-term workers employed for at least six months. 
 
A wider reform process was initiated in Germany, involving the modernisation of the 
vocational training system in the direction of better integration of the existing educational 
structures, experience and activities, so as to provide a flexible and open framework for 
lifelong learning, and better focus on persons with low qualifications, disadvantaged young 
and older people. In France, with the objective of significantly raising the number of 
apprentices in the medium-term, a large scale programme for the improvement, development 
and modernisation of apprenticeship was launched. 
 
In the area of welfare-related benefits, a new regulatory framework for the integration of 
people with disabilities was put in place in Finland, Lithuania and Slovenia. This new 
framework provides for the definition of disability and work capacity levels and the setting up 
of professional rehabilitation services and of mechanisms for the provision of subsidies. It 
also established the conditions to set up companies (social enterprises) employing at least 30-
40% of their staff among difficult to employ or disabled people. Financial support was 
foreseen for employers hiring people with disabilities and self-employed disabled people in 
Luxembourg. A modernisation and rationalisation of the system of subsidised sheltered 
working places for disabled people was conducted in the Netherlands and Spain. In the UK, 
an activation pilot scheme (‘Pathways to Work’), launched on an experimental basis in 
October 2003 and aimed at getting claimants of incapacity benefits back to work, was 
confirmed and further extended. 
 
4.2.4. Job  Protection  
 
Very few measures were adopted in the field of EPL in 2004, all at the margin of the 
employment protection legislation. Most targeted the flexibility of work contracts for new 
entrants and marginal workers, leaving unchanged the legislation on permanent employment.  
 
Notwithstanding the wide debate conducted in Italy on the need to reform the EPL for open-
ended contracts, measures enacted in 2004 were limited to setting the conditions for the 
implementation of the new types of flexible employment contracts introduced by the reform 
of the Italian labour market initiated in 2003
68. 
                                                 
68 Law 30/2003, “so-called Biagi Law”, and implementing Decree n. 267/2003.  
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In France, the so-called “Fillon Law” introduced some margins of flexibility in the procedure 
to be followed in case of collective dismissals. Following the new rules, firm-level 
agreements can now modify the procedure that must be followed in case of collective 
dismissal. Moreover, the threshold that triggers a collective dismissal procedure has been 
changed, the collective dismissal procedure shortened, the possibilities of employees' 
reintegration restricted when the judge deems the efforts of the firm in terms of placement or 
training not large enough. The placement and training requirements for large and small firms 
have also been modified. 
 
Measures adopted in the Czech Republic, Greece and Poland concerned the duration and 
maximum number of renewals of fixed term contracts, in compliance with EU directives. In 
Portugal, measures adopted in 2004 aimed at making the regime of home-work more flexible 
and reinforcing the protection of working students and young people at work. 
 
4.2.5. Pension  systems 
 
Most measures adopted in 2004 in the field of pensions and early retirement schemes were 
embedded in long-term reform packages. This was the case for Austria, Finland, Germany, 
Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK. Enacted measures generally involved the establishment of a 
stronger link between contributions and pension benefits, and therefore the possibility for 
workers to retire later, which should entail positive effects on the participation rate of older 
workers. 
 
In Austria, 2004 saw the adoption of measures completing the reform launched in 2003, 
including the introduction of a defined-contribution individual 'pension account' for each 
working person, the introduction of a single maximum limit on earnings liable to social 
insurance contributions for economically active people instead of the previous differing limits 
for various categories of people, and the reassessment of the levels of pension insurance 
contribution for all occupational groups.   
 
The pension reform adopted in 2003 in Finland was extended to the public sector in 2004: 
earnings over the entire employment history will affect the amount of pension; pension 
accrual will begin from the age of 18 and the accrual rate will rise with advancing age, up to 
4.5% from the age of 63 up to 68; the general retirement age will become flexible.  In 
Germany, the minimum entry age for early retirement on account of unemployment was 
raised from 60 to 63 years and the level of pension contributions was progressively raised. 
 
The measures adopted in 2004 in Italy need to be seen in the context of reform of the pension 
system undertaken in the 1990s, which involved the development of second pillar pension 
funds and the generalised introduction by 2008 of a pre-funded notional defined-contribution 
scheme in place of the current PAYG defined-benefit pension system. Such measures foresaw 
the progressive increase of retirement age, the possibility of accumulating pension benefits 
and earned income, an increased support in favour of the development of supplementary 
pension schemes, and the reduction of the limits to the cumulus of contributory periods to 
different pension schemes. 
 
Like in Italy, Hungary and Lithuania also introduced the possibility for people to continue 
working after their retirement age and to supply their state/occupational pension with new 
pension contributions completed after entitlement. Minimum retirement age was increased in  
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the Czech Republic and in the UK. In the latter country, the possibility was introduced to 
continue working part-time for the same employer while drawing an occupational pension. 
 
The amount of pre-retirement benefits was lowered in Poland, more rigid requirements 
introduced for being entitled to benefits and the access age increased for both men and 
women. In the Netherlands, existing tax incentives for early retirement were phased out. 
 
The restrictions to the access to welfare benefits that were imposed by the Dutch government 
followed the same activation approach, insofar as the tightening of the entitlement conditions 
to access the disability benefits were associated to a progressive increase in the tax credit, in 
line with the government plan to reduce the inactivity trap
69. 
 
A rationalisation of the pension system occurred in Greece: pension coverage was extended to 
all categories of workers, including self-employed and workers in the agricultural sector. 
 
4.2.6.  Wage bargaining  
 
In 2004, minimum wage settings were at the centre of policy action both in the EU15 and 
especially in the EU10. As part of the debate in EU10 countries, it was on the one hand 
recognised that minimum wage can have positive effects on the labour market, insofar as it 
makes work more attractive for those groups less attached to the labour market provided that 
it is accompanied by other making-work-pay policies (e.g. rebates of employers’ social 
security contributions on permanent contracts, tax credits for maternity leave, means tested 
tax credit etc). On the other hand, the appropriate level of minimum wage is in most countries 
related to social security legislation. Therefore, every increase in the minimum wage implies 
adjustments in areas such as the parameters for calculating social security contributions or the 
income threshold whereby people are assessed as being in material need. In some of the EU10 
Member States, the objective set by the government was to ensure that the minimum wage 
was raised more rapidly than the national average wage in the medium-term (e.g. in Lithuania 
and Estonia, where the objective was fixed of reaching 41% of the national average wage by 
2008). In other countries, it was feared that the already relatively high level of minimum wage 
(e.g. 41% of average wage in Slovakia) could negatively affect employment levels in 
geographical areas where unemployment rates are high and the living costs/productivity levels 
much lower than in the rest of the country. Some other countries used minimum wage to 
guarantee minimum level of pay for workers not covered by an effective wage bargaining 
(e.g. Spain, Cyprus). 
 
Central incomes policy agreements for the private sector were reached in Finland, Greece and 
Denmark. In Finland, the agreement provided for wage increases of 2.5% in 2005 and 2.1% in 
                                                 
69 The Reform of the Dutch Occupational Disability Insurance Act (WAO) involved a 5% increase as of 2006 of 
benefits for fully occupational disabled claimants, provided that the number of new WAO entrants falls to 
25,000 or below, coupled with a strong emphasis on the resumption of work with provision of supplementary 
wages and a re-examination on the basis of stricter criteria of all occupational disabled people under age of 50. 
People who lose their benefits and cannot find immediate employment will be offered the possibility to 
undertake a work reintegration scheme. Following the Repealing of the Self-Employed Persons Disablement 
Benefits Act (WAZ), as of 1st August 2004 self-employed persons are referred to private forms of insurance or 
to their own reserves to cover the risk of occupational disability, maternity and leave for adoption or child care. 
  
  - 36 -
2006
70. The pay increase will be higher for low-wage earners, while in 2006 an ‘equality 
increment’ of 0.3% will further improve the situation of low-wages and female dominated 
sectors. In the case of Denmark, lower increase rates were agreed for apprentices and trainees. 
In Ireland, an agreement was reached in the framework of the most recent national pact on 
Sustaining Progress, to review the level of national minimum wage. The agreement was 
aimed at giving certainty to the evolution of pay in the medium term and to sustain low-
income earners. To this end, it was coupled with an increase in the employee tax credit, which 
tended to remove all those on minimum wage from the tax net. 
 
The increase of national minimum wage was fixed by law in France (between 2.1 and 5.58%, 
depending on existing different SMIC rates), Luxembourg (2% increase), Spain (4.5% 
increase, up to € 513 per month in 2005) and the UK (up to £4.85 per hour). In this country, a 
lower ‘development rate’ was fixed for workers aged 18-21 and a minimum wage at £3 per 
hour was introduced for the first time for young workers aged 16 and 17. 
 
In Hungary, two tripartite agreements set the level of minimum wage (€ 240 per month) and 
the gross average increase (6%) recommended for 2005 at lower bargaining level both for the 
private and the public sector. The minimum wage in the private sector was also raised by 
tripartite agreement in Slovenia (up to € 513 per month from August 2005). In Cyprus, the 
government intervened to fix an increase in the statutory minimum wage for occupations 
characterized by low trade union coverage. A raise in the level of minimum wage in the 
private sector intervened also in Lithuania, in the framework of the government programme to 
promote an increasing minimum wage. Equally, the minimum wage was raised by 6.9% in the 
Slovak Republic and by 8% in Estonia for 2005.  
 
The 3% increase (up to € 185 per month) agreed in Poland was accompanied by reduced rates 
for new employees (80% of minimum in the first year and 90% in the second) and by the 
proposal of the government to introduce an “activation exemption”, consisting in an increase 
of the tax-deductible expenses associated with the income of the lowest-paid workers, while 
reducing deductible expenses for those earning more than the average remuneration, so as to 
enable an increase of the minimum wage in net terms without increasing the attendant 
burdens for employers. 
 
 
5.  Characterising Labour Market Reforms: an explorative analysis 
 
This section tries to identify common features in the measures enacted in 2004 across 
countries. The correlation between number of measures with two different characteristics 
provides a synthetic description of the main features of the reform process. Table 2.1 displays 
the correlation based on the percentage (out of total reforms), while table 2.2 displays the 
correlation based on their ranks.
71 A positive correlation between, say, “Incumbents & new 
entrants” and “Targeted” indicates that countries where a large number of measures apply to 
both incumbents and new entrants have also a high numbers of measures that are “Targeted” 
to specific groups. Similarly, a negative correlation between measures applied to “Incumbents 
                                                 
70 As part of the incomes policy agreement, the Finnish government decided to implement tax cuts worth €1.7 
billion in 2005-2007. € 1.3 billion of these will be in the form of income tax reductions. 
71 Simply, after having calculated the proportion out of total reforms of those with certain characteristics, the 
correlation between this ratio is calculated. The graph plots these correlations.  
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& new entrants” and measures that are “Embedded in a long-term policy package” implies 
that countries making a high number of reforms with the former feature also have a low 
number of reforms that are part of a formal package.  
 
From these correlations it is possible to identify the following patterns: 
 
•  countries where measures are often part of long-term policy packages also have a 
relative low number of policy interventions that apply to both incumbents and new 
entrants. Moreover, the correlation with the number of measures expected to have an 
impact on matching or on labour supply is negative, while that with measures with an 
(expected) effect on the labour demand is positive; 
 
•  The correlation between the proportion of reforms that are part of a long-term policy 
package and those expected to have en impact on matching or on wages is respectively 
positive and negative. These correlations reflect the large focus of reform programmes 
on measures that improve the matching between unemployed and vacancies. In 
contrast,  measures expected to have an impact on wages are most of the time geared 
to modify the contractual or statutory (minima) wages and, as such, are one-off 
measures; 
 
•  there is a positive and significant correlation between the number of reforms that are 
valid to both incumbents and the new entrants and the focus of policies on targeting. 
Countries that have enacted reforms that apply to both incumbents and the new 
entrants have not ignored the need to focus on target groups. On the other hand, less 
prominence has been given to measures with an expected impact on the matching 
between labour demand and labour supply; 
 
•  a large number of countries have taken initiatives in the area of taxation, often with the 
aim of reducing the tax burden at the lower end of the income distribution. This 
explains the positive correlation between targeting and measures that are expected to 
have an impact on the labour demand. Hence, when labour demand has been the focus 
of policy action, targeting also represents a significant percentage of total measures; 
 
•  in countries where a large number of policy measures make some reference to an 
impact for the public budget, there is a relatively high number of reforms which focus 
either on improving the matching between labour demand and labour supply or in 
affecting the wage formation mechanism. 
 
One way to describe the reform process is to compare the number of policy actions enacted 
with the level of distortions due to government interventions (captured for example by 
tightness of the index of EPL). Graph 4 reports on the vertical axis the total number of 
measures enacted in 2004 and on the horizontal axis the EPL1 OECD indicator (graph 4.1) or 
the OECD index of difficulty of dismissal of permanent contracts.
72 Member States can be 
divided in 4 groups. A first group of countries is characterised by both a number of measures 
enacted higher than the average and an index of tightness higher than the un-weighted 
average; Greece, France and Spain belong to this group. These countries are joined by Italy 
                                                 
72 To ease the comparison the data have been normalised transforming the original variable such to have same 
mean and same variance. The chart does not report the EU countries non-member of the OECD due to lack of 
information on the EPL for these countries.   
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and the Czech Republic when the measure of strictness of labour regulation refers only to the 
difficulty of dismissal of permanent contracts.
73 Countries located in the South-East quadrant 
have labour market legislation that is tighter than the average and a below average intensity of 
measures (Austria, Portugal and Sweden belong to this group). The South-West quadrant 
reports countries with a below average intensity of reform measures and labour market 
legislation less strict than the average. Hungary, Ireland and Belgium, but only if the index of 
dismissal of regular contracts is considered, are in this group. Finally, countries that in 2004 
made a number of measures higher than the average despite an already loose labour market 
regulation appear in the North-West quadrant. 
                                                 
73 For the year 2003, both countries ranked among the first six with the lowest (less regulated) index. In these 
countries the measures introduced have eased the regulation for the temporary workers without chaniging much 
the tightness for the regular contracts.   
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Table 2.1 
Correlation between percentage of reforms according to specific characteristics 
 
Incumbents and 
new entrants  Targeted 










Embedded in a long-term 
policy package  -0.3




Incumbents & new entrants    0.2
***  0.1 -0.1 -0.1  -0.4
***  -0.1 
Targeted     0.2  0.2
**  -0.1  -0.2
**  -0.1 




In bold correlation statistically significant at 5%  
 
Table 2.2 
Rank Correlation between percentage of reforms according to specific characteristics 
 
Incumbents and 
new entrants  Targeted 










Embedded in a long-term 
policy package  -0.3
***  0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0  0.4
*** -0.4
*** 
Incumbents & new entrants    0.2
***  0.0 -0.1 0.0  -0.4
***  0.0 
Targeted     0.1  0.2
* -0.2
*  -0.1 0.0 




*** statistically significant at 1% ; ** statistically significant at 5%, * statistically significant at 10% 
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Graph 4.1 
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Bivariate correlations only provide partial indication of the whole configuration of labour 
market reforms. Firstly, the information obtained is relative only to the two variables 
considered and, consequently, does not capture possible multiple correlations. Secondly, the 
correlation between the two variables might be indirect as the two variables might be linked 
to each other through a third variable.  
 
To get representative typology of reforms measures enacted in 2004, this section makes use of 
the method of the Principal Components Analysis (PCA). The PCA offers a way for reducing 
the dimensionality of a dataset without much loss of information. The whole set of indicators 
is synthesised into a reduced number of components able to describe a significant proportion 
of the original variability. It also helps to identify patterns in the data highlighting similarities 
and differences. In our case, the method provides an illustration of the principal characteristics 
of the policy measures enacted. 
74 
75 Those principal characteristics are captured by principal 
components or factors, which are linear combinations of the initial variables, uncorrelated 
(orthogonal) to each other. 
 
Table 3 reports the result of the principal components analysis on the dataset composed by the 
proportion of reforms with one of the eight characteristics and by the index of strictness of 
dismissal of permanent contract. This index refers to 2003 and has been chosen to represent 
the status of regulation in a given country at the moment when the measures were enacted 
(2004). It is meant capturing the broad context within which policy initiatives are taken.  
 
The principal components are labelled PC1, PC2, …, PC9. The upper panel shows the 
eigenvalues from the orthogonalisation of the sample correlation matrix, i.e. how much of the 
total variance in our dataset is explained by each principal component. The lower panel shows 
the eigenvectors (also called the factor loadings) used as weights to calculate the principal 
components as linear combinations of the original series. We pick up the components on the 
basis of their ability to explain significant variation in the data. On the ground of the criteria 
suggested in the literature we decided to select the first three principal components, 
                                                 
74 More formally, the PCA is a linear transformation that chooses a new coordinate system for the data set such 
that the greatest variance by any projection of the data set comes to lie on the first axis (then called the first 
principal component), the second greatest variance on the second axis, and so on. Because each consecutive 
component is defined to maximize the variability that is not captured by the preceding component, consecutive 
factors are independent of each other. The PCA is based on the following steps; 1) standardised the data to have 
zero mean and standard deviation equals to 1; 2) find the eigenvalues of the correlation matrix; 3) order them 
from the highest to the lowest, which gives the components by order of significance; 4) find the eigenvector 
corresponding to each eigenvalues subject to the condition that the norm equals 1. The principal components are 
obtained as linear combination of the original data. PC=Γx’ where Γ is the matrix with row the eigenvectors and 
x the vector of the original series.  
75 Hence the PCA simplifyies the problem of analysing jointly the information from different indicators while 
retaining those characteristics of the dataset that contribute most to its variance by eliminating the later principal 
components by a more or less heuristic decision.  These characteristics may be the "most important", but this is 
not necessarily the case. As we extract consecutive factors, they account for less and less variability. The 
decision of when to stop extracting factors basically depends on when there is only very little "random" 
variability left. Two criteria have been suggested in the literature. A first method is based on the plot of the 
eigenvalues in a simple line plot. The place where the smooth decrease of eigenvalues appears to level off to the 
right of the plot corresponds to the last eigenvalue to consider. The second criteria retain only factors with 
eigenvalues greater than 1. In essence this is like saying that, unless a factor extracts at least as much as the 
equivalent of one original variable, we drop it.   
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explaining 73% of the total variability. The principal components reveal clusters of policies 
packages.  
 
•  PC1 is characterised by a positive sign of the strictness of regulation for regular 
contracts and negative signs of all the other variables. This component captures about 
40% of the total variance. PC1 has a positive factor. This suggests that more flexible 
countries (i.e. with a low value of the index of strictness of regulation of EPL)
76 carry 
out a relative higher number of reforms. We refer to PC1 as the flexibility effect, which 
is capture the fact that more flexible labour markets have a better chances to be 
reformed.  
 
•  The second component explains around 20% of the total variability and about 60% 
together with the first component. PC2 has a relative positive factor for Budget, 
Embedd,  and negative for the rest of the indicators. This components captures a 
dimension of the reforms process which contrasts the broadness of the reform in more 
rigid countries (i.e. the measures enacted are part of a formal long-term policy package 
with a focus on the labour supply) against its deepness (i.e. more attention to target 
groups, measures applied to all the relevant population, focus on labour demand).  
 
•  PC3 is more difficult to interpret. This component accounts for 15% of total 
variability. It is characterised by a strong negative factor for the index of strictness of 
regular contracts and a positive factor for the proportion of measures with an expected 
impact on wages. This factor characterises the labour market reform along the 
flexibility-wage dimension. It suggests that less rigid countries do not need to take 
measures affecting the wage formation mechanism.
77 
 
The APC reveals a particular structure of reform policies undertaken by the Member States. 
Firstly, less regulated labour markets tend to have more synchronised, in the sense that a high 
proportion of the policy measures enacted have all the desirable characteristics identified by 
the database. Secondly, reforms that are enacted for large groups of targeted population (i.e. 
not only to the new entrants) are not necessarily devised as part of a formal long-term policy 
package. Finally, there is some evidence that more flexible labour markets do reforms which 
have a direct impact on the labour demand and labour supply. This is consistent with the view 
that the functioning of the labour market is in this case less represented by models of 
imperfect competition such as bargaining models. 
 
                                                 
76 Remember that data are standardised, hence a negative value for the strictness variable corresponds to an index 
of strictness of the regulation of regular contract lower than the average (i.e. a looser regulation).  
77 Similarly, more flexible countries more frequently adopt reforms that may have a direct impact on labour 
market performance through either labour demand or labour supply. To be effective, these measures should be 
valid also for incumbents and new entrants. - 43 - 
Table 3 Principal components analysis      
Correlation of BUDGET EMBEDD INCUMNEWENT TARGETED DISMISS LD LS MATCHING WAGES          
  PC 1  PC 2  PC 3  PC 4  PC 5  PC 6  PC 7  PC 8  PC 9 
Eigenvalue  3.39 1.82 1.36 0.75 0.53 0.51 0.33 0.16 0.15 
Variance  Prop.  0.38 0.20 0.15 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02 
Cumulative Prop.  0.38  0.58  0.73 0.81 0.87 0.93 0.97 0.98  1 
Eigenvectors:          
Variable  Vector 1  Vector 2  Vector 3  Vector 4  Vector 5  Vector 6  Vector 7  Vector 8  Vector 9 
Budget  -0.45 0.17 0.12 -0.43 -0.08 0.03 0.35 0.15 -0.65 
Embedded  -0.37 0.35  -0.003  -0.02 -0.55 -0.02 -0.63 -0.18 0.05 
Incumbents and new entrants   -0.42 -0.26 -0.31 0.11  0.26 0.11 -0.32 0.69 0.04 
Targeted   -0.35 -0.31 0.005 0.29 -0.24 -0.74 0.27 -0.04  0.095 
Strictness of dismissal for regular contract   0.20 -0.18 -0.63 -0.03 -0.61 0.26 0.28 0.096  -0.02 
Labour demand   -0.13 -0.60 -0.22 -0.41 0.19 0.004 -0.27 -0.53 -0.13 
Labour Supply  -0.25 0.32 -0.47 0.52 0.33 0.12 0.12 -0.40  -0.23 
Matching   -0.48 0.03 0.09 -0.18 0.02 0.36 0.37 -0.15 0.66 
Wages  -0.10 -0.43 0.46 0.50 -0.23 0.47  -0.001  -0.08 -0.25 
 
Note: the ACP is on the EU countries Member of the OECD; all variables but EPL are proportion of measures with a specific characteristics.   
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